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Student performance has been used extensively in discussion about the quality of education 
systems in both academic and non-academic writing. This thesis examines the role of private 
and public provision of education in student performance. Using PISA data from 2003-2015 
this thesis examines Finland and Sweden as most similar cases with a major difference in the 
role of market incentives in their education systems.  
This thesis uses a multilevel regression model with student and school level variables. While 
private schools tend to correlate with higher student performance results for an individual 
student, the student level features such as socio-economic background have a more significant 
impact on student attainment. The analysis does not support the theoretical notion that through 
competition school quality will increase in both the private and public sector when measuring 
student performance. Further research into student selection can help in determining factors 
regarding the possible performance gap in private and public schools yet lower overall student 
performance in a system with a larger private sector. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years education has been a growing topic for research in economics and social sciences 
and this trend has been attributed to several factors, among others increased education levels, 
concern for economic outcomes, availability of better and more data, methodological 
innovations and so on (e.g. Machin 2014). Results from comparative and international 
education research has been for example used as a tool in policy design (Mattheou 2014) and 
teacher training (Collet 2014). Since the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD from now on) began conducting the Programme for International Student 
Attainment (PISA from now on) studies in 2000, the results on measuring international student 
attainment have drawn attention in discourse about education in media, politics and academic 
writing. This thesis will take an economic approach to education systems, and attempts to 
examine public and private provision of education and its effects on the level of student 
performance in comparing the Finnish and Swedish education systems.  
In this thesis, the cases of Finland and Sweden will be highlighted as a most similar 
cases study, examining the relation between variables representing public and private provision 
of education and student performance through the method of multi-level analysis. Various 
international standardized tests and surveys have gathered information about student 
performance of numerous education systems in different countries and economies throughout 
the years, but the PISA studies remain the most extensive and largest in scope. This thesis will 
use the data of five PISA cycles from 2003 to 2015 to examine student performance and other 
control variables on country, school, and student level. Some additional data sources will also 
be used. 
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Whether the school is private or public does not necessarily affect the performance of 
the students or the quality of education in itself, but especially the presence of for-profit 
incentives can have an effect on the outcomes of a system. This has been illustrated in previous 
literature in terms of other public institutions such as health care (e.g. Sieberg & Shvetsova 
2012) and criminal justice (Sieberg 2005) when private provision has created unexpected 
outcomes. Finland and Sweden both had largescale educational reforms in the 1990s, and thus 
the profit motive is a clear difference between the private actors in the current Finnish and 
Swedish school systems. This thesis will present a model on the incentives for the schools, and 
test this model using the PISA data. 
The thesis will not attempt to offer a comprehensive review of the entire education 
system nor will it claim private and public actors as the only meaningful factor in an education 
system. However, a focus on a certain theme or topic can add to the existing literature, and 
Finland and Sweden have not been used in a most similar cases case study in this regard. The 
questions which the thesis looks at can be formulated as follows: 
1) What kind of an effect, if any, does the private or public provision of education have 
on student performance in the Finnish and Swedish systems according to the PISA 
data? 
2) Is there evidence for the theoretical model presented? 
The focus of the thesis relates to these questions, but also secondary questions can be 
considered, and formulated as the following: 
3) What other significant factors contribute to the student performance in the data? 
4) How do the results compare with the established previous literature on student 
performance? 
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 The same kind of questions about school competition have been posed in the literature 
previously regarding private and public schools and student attainment, but the empirical 
evidence has been either from different contexts (e.g. Urquoila 2016) or more broad (OECD 
report 2011) in scope, so this thesis will add to the issue by its focus and case design. The role 
of private and public providers in institutions, or indeed education, is by no means a new or 
original topic in the literature, but it is an essential and multilayered issue which requires and 
benefits from examination from different perspectives and contexts for research. 
First I will discuss the myriad of ways in which education systems and private and public 
provision have been studied in the literature in different contexts, countries, and economies. In 
addition I will introduce how the effect of other factors on student performance have been 
studied as well. I will utilize this to identify the incentives involved, and a model based on the 
incentives of markets in education provision will be presented. Previous research using the 
PISA data will also be discussed, as well as the data I will utilize in the analysis. A multilevel 
analysis and its results will be discussed in the results, and finally concluding remarks as well 
as topics for further research will be discussed.  
The results of the analysis show a positive correlation with public schools and student 
attainment, yet theory, including the model discussed, question whether the positive effect is 
due to improvement in the entire system or if this is due to a performance gap caused in part 
also by the decrease in quality of the public schools. 
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2. Literature review 
This chapter will focus on the previous literature as well as the institutional role of education 
provision and the significance of various factors on student performance. This includes relevant 
literature on education from the economic perspective on education and the role of private and 
public provision, student performance, as well as use of PISA data and multi-level analysis in 
education research. Finland and Sweden are selected as a most similar case in the analysis, and 
the background of their educational systems will also be briefly discussed. 
 
2.1. Theoretical Background 
This section will first look at the role of private schools and how they are presented in the 
Finnish and Swedish systems. Although great variation obviously exists in education systems 
across countries, the purpose of an education system can be argued to be in many ways 
universal. Education is often seen as a service that to an extent (especially at the primary level) 
is provided for everyone, and as such has been discussed alongside health care, social welfare 
and criminal justice in the literature (e.g. Shemilt et al. 2010). Although not meeting the 
definition of a purely public good per se (e.g. Head & Shoup 1969), basic education in both 
Finland and Sweden have the public sector and public policy in a major role, and it is virtually 
impossible to exclude a pupil from receiving education. The PISA studies test students exactly 
at this stage of schooling system, as receivers of education with the non-excludable quality of 
a public good. Moreover, education has been characterized as “a fundamental human right and 
a core responsibility of governments (Singh 2015, 309)” as well as a tool in investing in human 
capital (Becker 1993). 
The value from education for society can be viewed in economic terms. Guzavicius et 
al. (2015) see education as means to increase knowledge in the population, and that “knowledge 
should promote rational behavior (885)” and therefore lead to more optimal economic 
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outcomes. Even if one were to disregard the role of education as a human right and look at the 
issue from an entirely material perspective, there is a great deal of evidence to show that 
education plays a role in investing in human capital and well-being, and therefore contributes 
to the development of countries and economies. Regarding these benefits Becker (1993) states 
that  
“…few if any countries have achieved a sustained period of economic development 
without having invested substantial amounts in their labor force, and most studies that 
have attempted quantitative assessments of contributions to growth have assigned an 
important role to investment in human capital. Again, inequality in the distribution of 
earnings and income is generally positively related to inequality in education and other 
training. To take a final example, unemployment tends to be strongly related, usually 
inversely, to education. (12)” 
The role of the public provision of schooling in society has been acknowledged in 
previous literature. Even with market incentives in mind the public provision of education can 
be seen as a beneficial outcome for society: for example with regard to the USA it has been 
noted that “the success of public schooling must be at least partially attributed to the social 
utility of the state intervening to deal with the difﬁculty of enforcing debt contracts backed by 
human capital, and to the positive externalities associated with a better educated and potentially 
more mobile populace (Black & Sokoloff 2006, 102).” Even on an individual level, increased 
education has been shown to have a positive impact on personal income (e.g. Becker 1993). 
The literature shows how education is an institution which has benefits for both society 
as well as benefits for the individual. Education has an undeniable role in economies, and 
although it is not a public good it is often universal. Highlighting the benefits and advantages 
of education illustrates how every system would have an incentive to provide it, and how every 
individual in a society can have an incentive to obtain the best possible education. The role of 
student performance in education will be discussed in later parts, but for the purposes of the 
model it is important to show why any state system would have the incentive to maximize 
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education provision. The following will highlight the role a public or private provider has in 
distributing education, and the optimality of outcomes. 
 
2.2. Private provision in education systems: theoretical approaches 
There are multiple viewpoints on how private actors operate and what the outcome of their 
inclusion is for education systems in the literature. Before reviewing empirical evidence some 
theoretical approaches will be discussed, with both the theoretical benefits and disadvantages 
of private actors in a system. 
In the literature focusing on the design of education systems there are various 
approaches, both descriptive (e.g. Agasiti 2014 examines the efficiency of public spending on 
education on a comparative level) as well as strongly prescriptive analyses (e.g. Friedman 
1997). The call for privatization was seen by for example Friedman as a solution that: 
“…will unleash the drive, imagination and energy of competitive free enterprise to 
revolutionize the education process. The competition will force government schools to 
improve in order to retain their clientele. Except for a small group who have a vested 
interest in the present system, everyone would win: parents, students, teachers, 
taxpayers, private entrepreneurs and, above all, the residents of the central cities.” (342, 
1997).  
Although this seems like a strong statement, it clearly shows that the provider of 
education is seen to have significance in the political discourse on education, and in this instance 
privatization is presented as an optimal solution for society as a whole. Relying on market 
theory, introducing private operators would in theory lead to a more preferred outcome for both 
the private and public schools as well as individuals in a society. 
Private schools often tend to have public funding, and the money can be allocated 
through a voucher system for example. Defenders of private operators in education see market 
incentives leading to competition, and that for example in the case of school vouchers will “in 
addition to indirectly improving educational experiences for all public-school students by 
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exerting competitive pressure on public schools, vouchers should directly help the most 
disadvantaged children, allowing them the opportunity to exit unsafe and underperforming 
schools (Hart 2014, 186).” Per this rationale there should be both an increase in the quality of 
public schools, as well as migration of students away from underperforming schools. Student 
performance can be suggested to correlate with the quality of a school, so this hypothesis could 
be observable in the PISA studies. 
There are other theoretical approaches which contradict the introduction of private 
operators in the education market and their effect on society. Urquoila (2016) discusses the 
implications of introducing a voucher system: as families have access to vouchers, this “lowers 
the cost of private schooling and may lead the private sector to grow as it enrolls more high-
income households. If this happens, public schools choose to lower their effort to the level 
required to retain only low-income students. Hence competition may lower public school 
productivity (216).” This approach will be discussed more in the chapter about the theoretical 
model in this thesis, but it shows that the logic from competition has been suggested to yield 
also different outcomes than simply increase in quality at the country level of the system.  
Epple and Romano (1996) present the ends-against-the-middle equilibrium in 
discussing private schools ran with a voucher system. Although a simplified model, it claims 
that “we find it plausible that, for education, high-income households are more willing to 
substitute public education for other goods than low-income households… …an equilibrium is 
characterized by a balancing of a middle-income coalition preferring higher public expenditure 
against a coalition of high- and low- income households preferring lower expenditure (323).” 
The ends-against-the-middle refers to exactly this unified opposition by both the high-income 
and low-income households, which have different reasons for their resentment but end up in 
the same opposition. This model suggests that on a theoretical level, introduction of private 
operators in an education system can lead to the decline in allocating resources to public actors, 
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and this theory contradict the notion that competition will increase the school quality in the 
public sector, too.  
 
2.2.1. Private provision in education systems: empirical evidence 
The theories on the introduction of private schools differ from their perspectives and 
implications, and the empiric research in this has produced a great deal of mixed results from 
various perspectives too, and this section will briefly present some of these findings. The role 
of student performance is emphasized for the purposes of this thesis, although other effects and 
implications are not ignored to provide context and to showcase the multiple aspects of 
education systems in different types of countries and economies, all of which can be affected 
in different ways when private providers are introduced. 
There have been mixed results in discussing the competition of private and public 
schools. Urquiola (2016) notes that evidence in randomized experiments from the USA, and 
Colombia and India. Urquila mentions that for example the introduction of voucher schools to 
an education market has mixed results, as “on the one hand, the findings suggest that greater 
private participation can cause more sorting/stratification. On the other hand, the evidence on 
achievement effects is mixed (233).” In regards to students moving from public to private 
schools suggests that there can be benefits, but the data shows that this is the case mostly the 
students in Colombia, and for lower socioeconomic status students from the USA (232), 
implying that context also matters. In India, the study found that in a lottery for school vouchers, 
the lottery winners “did not have higher test scores than losers in Telugu (the local language), 
math, English, science, and social studies; in contrast, they did perform significantly better in 
Hindi” (221). 
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Overall, in the context of developing countries research suggests that “private schools 
were more productive (by being able to deliver similar learning outcomes in math and language 
at lower financial and time cost), but not necessarily more effective at raising test scores” 
(Glewwe & Muralidharan 2016, 725). In examining private and public schools in India, 
Muralidharan & Sundararaman find that “it may be possible to substantially increase human 
capital formation in developing countries like India by making more use of private provision in 
the delivery of education (1058).” Research suggests that private schools benefit students most 
in the context of developing countries. 
The role of private schools in raising student performance in developed countries has 
been found to be somewhat mixed or non-existent in the literature. Experiments involving 
lottery-based attendance to private elite schools in China have shown no effect on the level of 
student performance (Zheng 2014). It should be noted that Zheng specifically looks at 
prestigious “elite” schools, so it could be argued that even in the top level private schools do 
not in itself increase student performance.  In the USA similar results were found in Chicago 
involving lottery-based school vouchers (Cullen et al. 2006): student performance was not 
affected. In the USA the role of a special kind of private schools, charter schools, in terms of 
student attainment is found to be minimal: “Taken as a whole, the evidence suggests that, 
accounting for differences in population served, charter schools are not, on average, producing 
student achievement gains any better than TPSs [author’s note: traditional public schools]. 
(Epple, Romano & Zimmer 2016, 203).” This evidence also seems to contradict the theoretic 
notion of improved student performance across private and public schools when introducing 
competition to the school market.  
Whether a private school is a for-profit school or for example a school ran by a religious 
organization can be seen to affect the incentives of a school.  Lee & Bryk (1989) analyze student 
achievement in US Catholic high schools and public schools, and discovered that the 
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organizational structure of Catholic high school curriculum, “a core academic program for all 
students, regardless of background and future educational aspiration (188)” could have 
produced higher level student attainment scores. Here however it is not a matter of who provides 
the education, but how the provision is structured on a curriculum level: whether the provider 
is private or public is not suggested to be relevant. It is also worth noting that this notion of a 
base-level for all resembles the Finnish peruskoulu curriculum structure developed in the 1990s, 
which will be discussed more in detail in later chapters. 
In terms of competition the fact that students are free to select their school is essential. 
An argument could be made that in primary education it is rarely just the pupil making the 
choice about which school to attend, but the family as a unit plays a part in the selection process. 
There have been critical views on the reasons that the families have for opting for a private 
option in the competitive market. Hart (2014) suggests that “parents may opt into voucher use 
because their public options are very poor, and even mediocre private schools shine in 
comparison” (188) and for example survey data from the US in Florida (Forster & D’Andrea 
2009) and Milwaukee (Witte 2000) supports this as families self-reported this as a reason for 
opting for school vouchers. This could create an incentive for private schools to only slightly 
outperform public schools, and in cases where the public schools do not fare well this difference 
does not have to be a massive one. 
 
2.3. Education systems 
As this thesis will focus on the Swedish and Finnish systems as most similar cases set-up, the 
education systems for both countries will be contrasted and briefly introduced. Some historical 
aspects are presented to show the differences in the systems. Finland and Sweden have been 
treated before as a most similar case (e.g. Gebhard 2013), “based on their shared Nordic 
heritage, established historical ties, cultural and ideological similarities (365).” Table 1 shows 
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Eurostat indicators for Finland and Sweden from the category “Education” to illustrate 
similarities in education between the two countries.  
Table 1: Eurostat Finland and Sweden (all data from 2012 unless 
otherwise indicated) 
 Finland Sweden  
Eurostat variable (Education)       
School expectancy (Years) 20.5  19.9  
    
Pupil/teacher ratio in primary education (Pupils per teacher) 13.6    11.8  
    
Students - Tertiary education (1000) 308.9 453.3  
    
Pupils learning English (% Upper secondary general education)  99.6 100.0  
    
Employment rates of recent graduates (% 77.4 [2016] 86.7 [2016]  
    
Share of women among tertiary students (%) 
 
53.7 
 
 
59.7 
  
Public expenditure on education (% of GDP) 6.76 [2011] 6.82[2011]  
  
It should be noted that the Eurostat data showcased in Table 1 is used to illustrate the 
most similar cases design used, and although the data used in the analysis includes country 
variables, they are not from the Eurostat data. Nevertheless, before discussing the differences 
in the systems it is beneficial to also identify similarities. The methodology section will discuss 
the most similar cases design, but the previous discussion showcases the basis for choosing 
Finland and Sweden as the two systems for the analysis. Figure 1 below shows the student 
performance scores in Finland and Sweden in math, reading and science  from the beginning of 
the PISA studies in 2000 to the latest batch of results from 2015. 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
 
 
Figure 1. PISA scores from 2000-2015, FIN & SWE results. 
 
 The gap between the overall level of student performance in Sweden and Finland is 
evident. Worth noting is that the 2000 cycle is omitted from the analysis of this thesis, and the 
current trend for Finland has been in decline since 2006, while the Swedish results have seen 
an increase in test scores in the latest results. This thesis however does not discuss the direction 
of the trend but discusses the results in more descriptive manner. 
 
2.3.1. Education systems: Sweden 
The foundation of the Swedish education system did not include a strong private presence, but 
“Sweden has a historical tradition of policies on educational equality that culminated in the 
1960s in one of the most  radical  comprehensive  school  systems  in  Europe” and in post-War 
Sweden “the provision of education and social welfare was a deeply  intertwined process” 
(Wiborg 2010, 3). For the system in place during the PISA studies there has been a more recent 
reform which contributes to the role of private provision of education, and a significant 
difference between the Finnish and Swedish models. 
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The Swedish education system went through a reform in 1991 in regards to private and 
public schools. The reform introduced more school choice, and allocation of public funding to 
any school the student attends, essentially introducing a voucher system. The schools “may be 
religious and/or operated for-profit. They are not allowed to charge tuition add-ons, and must 
be open to all students regardless of their municipality of origin, ethnicity, or religion (Urquiola 
2016, 229).” There is a great deal of public funding involved in the schools, as the reform 
entitled “full public funding to be calculated on the basis of the number of students” (Wiborg 
2010, 9) for the private schools. The share of private operators in the Swedish market boomed 
after the reform (Bettinger 2011, 559). 
Urquiola also notes that although national comparisons have found the private schools 
to perform higher in Sweden, there is an issue of grading in the national test comparisons 
(“independent schools were more likely to have their grades lowered after a second 
examination. It is possible that the independent schools — perhaps under greater pressure to 
please parents and to compete — engaged in more grade inflation. (231)”) and that in 
international comparisons the overall Swedish student performance “has seen significantly 
deteriorating performance in the years since vouchers were implemented” (231). On the surface 
level this would contradict the notion that through competition both public and private schools 
would increase their performance. Some studies have concluded that the overall level of 
Swedish schools was, in the public sector also, improved after the introduction of the voucher 
program (Bjorklund et al. 2004, Sandstrom & Bergstrom 2002). It should be noted that these 
studies do not consider PISA data, and use data from the early 2000s, when only the first ever 
PISA cycle from 2000 had been published. 
 
14 
 
 
 
2.3.2. Education systems: Finland 
The Finnish education system has also went through a reform in the 1990s. Before the reform 
in terms of student performance “education in Finland was nothing special in international 
terms” (Sahlberg 2014, 2). Sahlberg attributes the early 1990s recession as a contributor to the 
“peruskoulu or the 9-year comprehensive basic school” (3) reform. This reform did not include 
a voucher system to independent schools, for-profit or other, but Sahlberg highlights among 
others three key issues which were introduced: equal opportunity principle, career guidance and 
counseling becoming compulsory at school, and merging teachers from both academic oriented 
grammar schools as well as work-oriented civic schools into working at the same school (29-
30).  
Since the beginning of the PISA studies Finnish students have shown high student 
achievement in the tests, however with declining results in recent years. Still, the Finnish model 
has been found to be a successful one, e.g. Agasisti notes that in terms of efficiency and public 
spending on education countries like Finland “represent the ‘golden standard’ (2014, 554).” In 
this regard a lack of competition has not yielded sub-par results in the education system. 
Compared to Sweden there is a difference in the Finnish school system in terms of 
private and public provision. Regarding funding “there are only a small number of private 
foundations that provide funds to public education in Finland, and they have to operate under 
the close supervision of the authorities. Their influence on education policies or the direction 
of education reforms is next to none” (Sahlberg 2014, 143). 
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2.4. Student performance 
It should be noted that student performance in itself is naturally not a result of a single factor: 
“Education outcomes, ranging from performance on standardized tests to high school and 
postsecondary attainment, are determined by many factors including parental inputs, school 
inputs and environmental factors. But perhaps just as important are inputs from students 
themselves (Lavecchia et al. 2016, 3).” Acknowledging that there are indeed many factors 
involved, this thesis and the following model will focus on the part public/private provision can 
have in this process. 
 
2.5. The PISA studies 
This part will briefly introduce the PISA studies as a measuring tool for student attainment, and 
discuss its use as a tool in the literature. The role of student performance in academic research 
and public discourse will be discussed as well as the previous studies relating to student 
performance both across countries as well as in individual cases. 
The PISA studies are conducted in cycles every three years to measure the competency 
and performance of students in various OECD and partner countries. The first PISA study was 
conducted in 2000, and the latest results as of writing were published in 2015. Each PISA study 
measures the skills of 15-year-old students in three key subjects: reading, mathematics and 
science, with each cycle having a special focus on one of the subjects. In the latest PISA study 
conducted in 2015 over half a million students from 72 countries and economies were assessed 
(OECD.org). 
The PISA studies conducted by the OECD have played a significant role in public 
discussion and opinion on education policies, and for example Rautalin (2014) discusses how 
the results and rankings are often used in the context of education policy design as a rhetoric 
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tool, for example used in arguments for or against reforms. Although measuring the success of 
an education system is challenging, and PISA rankings do not necessarily offer a 
comprehensive look at a given system, it is undeniably important in any discussion on education 
policies and thus provides a powerful tool for the purposes of this analysis.  
Student performance is obviously not a conclusive indicator of a success of an education 
system. As previously mentioned however, as measurements such as PISA studies have become 
a part of the public discourse on education it has taken a considerable role in education policy 
and design. Ozga et al. 2011 note that this can lead to micro level incentives to teachers and 
schools, such as teaching for the test and schools “cream-skimming” students: where schools 
seek to find students who will perform well in student performance indicators (153). The role 
of evaluation also has been suggested to possibly have a larger macro-level effect, and if a great 
deal of meaning is placed on quality assurance and evaluation it can in part “redefine the goals 
of education” (153).  
As mentioned, PISA studies have had an effect both in Finland and Sweden in public 
discourse related to education systems, so the notion of evaluation as a guiding tool in shaping 
education policies is not far-fetched: “the  evaluation  according  to  standardized  criteria  
defined  by  international  skill  assessment  programmes” has been suggested to be prone to 
moving from “only  a  political,  pedagogical  practice measuring the acquisition of knowledge” 
and into governance (Vega Gil 2013, 100). Too much emphasis on student attainment needs to 
be considered with a level of caution when drawing conclusions in comparisons between 
education systems. From this it could be deduced that it is important that student attainment 
results and surveys should be approached with criticism in terms of representing an education 
system. 
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Recognizing the fact that student performance is only one aspect of an education system, 
and that it can be suggested that placing too much focus on it can ultimately be used to govern 
the system itself, it is nevertheless a significant factor in studying education from the point of 
view of political science, economics and social sciences. Student performance has been used in 
several studies, and PISA data is often the primary source for it. In previous literature the PISA 
data has also been utilized in examining the role of private and public schools in student 
performance both across countries and within a particular system. 
In the literature there are multiple viewpoints and perspectives from which student 
performance has been examined using different variables and approaches. Multi-level analysis 
has been utilized with PISA data before in cases such as individual countries, i.e. Martini & 
Ricci 2010, examining the province of Bolzano (Alto-Adige) in Italy in terms of science 
performance with 2006 PISA data, or Karakolidis, Pitsia & Emvalotis (2016) with 2012 PISA 
data on math performance in Greece. The results have shown the statistically significant effect 
of for example classroom language (Martini & Ricci) and student background factors such as 
gender, pre-primary education attendance and ESCS, that is the PISA index of economic, social 
and cultural status (Karakolidis, Pitsia & Emvalotis). It has been shown that student 
performance does not however depend on for example the spending, as research shows that 
“there is no linear relationship between expenditures and educational performance: there are 
examples of countries that obtain good results even when investing few resources, and others 
that obtain low performances despite their (relatively) large investments.” (Agasiti 2014, 553). 
A 2012 OECD report uses data on the 2009 PISA survey on the role of private and 
public schools, and concludes that private schools tend to yield better student performance 
results as “in most countries, privately managed schools tend to have more autonomy, better 
resources, and perform better on the PISA reading scale than publicly managed schools (7).” 
However the report also notes how “on average across OECD countries, over three-quarters of 
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the score-point difference in performance between publicly and privately managed schools can 
be attributed to the capacity of privately managed schools to attract socio-economically 
advantaged  students (20).” This result is in accordance with the previous literature on school 
choice, but it should also be noted that the report found that “in those countries where privately 
managed schools receive higher proportions of public funding, there is less stratification 
between publicly and privately managed schools. (7)” Both Finland and Sweden are mentioned 
as countries where public funding is prevalent in private schools in the report: in fact, Sweden 
and Finland both have an above OECD average level of public funding in private schools and 
a share of students attending public schools (OECD 2012, 22). 
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3. The model 
The analysis is used to test a model which represents the hypothesis of this thesis. The model 
is a theoretical economic model which attempts to show the differences in incentives when 
market incentives are introduced, and discuss possible equilibrium derived from these 
incentives by applying intuition from economics.  
 
3.1. The basic model: incentives 
The model presented draws from the intuition of the for-profit role of private schools in an 
education system and depicts the function of market incentives in the provision of education. 
Private schools are considered in terms of their incentives on what kind of students they would 
prefer, as well as the incentives of the families making a school choice between private and 
public institutions. 
The model depicts the functions of education provision in a society of N individuals, 
choosing between public and private provider of education, with the education having varying 
levels of quality, 𝑞 ∈ [𝑞, 𝑞]. The quality of education in the public sector is Q, and is financed 
by general taxation. In the private sector, an individual can opt to choose private education for 
any level, q, that he wants. All values of q and Q include features such as quality of teachers, 
students, resources etc. Every student gets utility from choosing a school, and wants to choose 
a school with the best possible Q/q that they can afford with an assumed budget constraint. The 
consumer who pays a premium 𝜋 for schooling or education will purchase the highest possible 
level 𝑞 = 𝑞, and the private school will provide it. 
When the model discusses an individual making a choice it should be noted that this 
does not necessarily mean the student. In terms of behavioural economics, Lavecchia et al. 
(2016) state that for a student entering a school, even in terms of cognitive and neurological 
20 
 
 
 
development they are not likely to be able to make the optimal long-term decisions about 
education (2). Also, in terms of families, decision-making is not simple: “investing in education 
may be more costly for low-income parents, so choosing to invest less is optimal” but that also 
when parents make decisions they 
“…may simply value education differently, although that valuation may be similarly 
impacted by the same behavioural [sic] barriers that affect students (eg, the low salience 
of long-term benefits). Another explanation is that low-income parents are less involved 
because they have less information about how to effectively invest.” (15-16) 
This model treats factors such as these as the budget constraint, indicating that not all 
families will make decisions in the same manner, as factors such as cognitive development, 
valuing education and having access for information will restrict the selection. Nevertheless, 
individuals will still attempt to maximize their utility, the q of education, so the logic of the 
model does not contradict this. 
The model does not assume that the students have a static level of skills, but the q of the 
school interacts with the students. The students and schools have a cumulative, interactive effect 
on each other: a school with good resources helps students perform better, and accumulating 
low-maintenance students can affect the quality of the school. In this model, not only students 
with already high ability but also the students with lower ability can benefit in several ways: 
they get help from classmates, hard-working students can make for a better working 
environment, the school can afford better teaching equipment, and attract a bigger pool of 
teachers the school can choose from. Conversely, a concentration of high-maintenance students 
who take up resources has an effect in the school, and the environment can become detrimental 
also for the students. A classroom can see a larger concentration of students with no resources, 
behavioural issues, worse class-room equipment and tools, the teacher can become stressed or 
the working environment might not attract teachers, or the school might not simply afford to 
compete with teacher salaries. In terms of conventional logic, even the performance of good 
students can suffer from poor resources and low-performing classmates and/ or school, and it 
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is difficult for the already low-performing students to get better. This logic of students’ ability 
not only being an individual trait, but a combination of peer effect and schools’ resources is 
also presented and discussed in a theoretical model in previous literature for example by 
Urquoila (2016). 
In a system with for profit private schools, the schools can be suggested to have 
incentives to select students, either those who will pay a high premium 𝜋, or who will not use 
up resources (so called “cream skimming”). Student selection can then give them an advantage 
that the public sector does not generally have. If the private sector is in the position to skim the 
best student material this can lead to public schools being left with either less resources or more 
under-performing students, making them a less appealing alternative for both students and 
teachers. This can lead to a situation where q increases and Q decreases, and vice versa. 
Individual who opts for private education is faced with the utility function 𝑢(𝑞, 𝑦 − 𝛽𝑝), 
utility increases in y and q. In addition, the person opting for a private school gets utility from 
a level of prestige γ related to the particular school: this prestige can include anything from 
word of mouth reputation to student achievements to school location. As previous research 
shows, not all families do this selection process with the same consideration, so the constraints 
can be subjective. The value of γ can vary depending on the system already in place. γ can be 
seen to be included in the q of the school. 
The utility from paying for a private school is 
𝑉𝐼(𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑦, 𝛽) = 𝑢(𝑞, 𝑦 − 𝛽𝑝)  
And the utility from being in a public school system can be presented as: 
𝑉𝑝(𝑄, 𝑦) = 𝑢(𝑄, 𝑦) 
22 
 
 
 
3.2. Plausible outcomes 
This can lead to two different outcomes: In Case 1 just enough people leave the public sector 
and join private schools by freeing up resources for the public ones. Especially the theoretical 
notion about markets and competition would suggest that students could leave low-performing 
schools, and this would support this outcome. Through competition the public schools would 
also have to allocate their resources better to maintain a certain level of students. 
Case 2 however includes the idea of student selection, leading to private schools opting 
for students who bring more resources than they take, leaving public schools with no such 
strategies. In time this would make private schools a more appealing option for families, ending 
up with more resources disappearing from the public sector. Eventually also for example 
teachers would find the workplace at public sector less appealing, and a self-sustaining 
equilibrium is reached in which the level of public schools starts to decrease. 
 With no market incentives, it should be noted that the schools would not have as much 
of an incentive to select students due to resources as there would not be similar need to 
maximize the profit. As is the case of Finland, some other reason than the profit motive would 
be needed to establish a private school, such as curriculum or a pedagogical theory. This does 
not imply that the schools would not be seeking to maximize their utility: any school would still 
prefer more resources, and families would prefer schools with higher rather than lower q. 
Indifference could lower the variation between the schools for both, as there would be no school 
level incentives to select any particular school. In this case, the distribution of students can be 
suggested to be more random than in the case where competition drives school choice. This 
more random grouping will lead to more variation in the student material per school, taking 
away some of the peer effect which drastically improves or decreases student performance. 
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3.3. The limitations of the model 
The model, as any model, relies on some assumptions. There are assumptions about both 
schools and students/ families as rational actors who want to maximize their utility. The 
students/ families can do this through selecting better-quality schools, and schools by preferring 
high-attainment students who bring more resources than they take. Interaction between high-
performing and low-performing students and schools is assumed to occur, amplifying both the 
results for top performance as well as underperforming. 
 
3.4. The implications of the model 
The implications of this model are based on the incentive that the private schools have in 
picking and choosing students. Although they are not in the position to decline any student from 
enrolling, they have an incentive to target students in a different way than public schools. 
Previous literature shows that school choice does depend on the family or the student making 
the choice, and there are different constraints on this. It is not a stretch to suggest that families 
or students with no interest or resources in choosing a school will more likely end up in a public 
school in such a system. 
The model would suggest two observable results: either a system where the private 
sector in a sense “picks up the slack” and frees resources for the public sector, improving quality 
of the entire system. On the other hand it can lead to a system where the private schools out-
perform the public schools, but this does not increase the overall level of performance as the 
public sector can become worse. As any model, this also relies on assumptions about the 
incentives and resources of the students, the families as well as the schools, so it is possible that 
neither of the outcomes holds up when examining the data. 
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 As mentioned previously, in both the Finnish and Swedish systems the private schools 
cannot decline a student from enrolling. However, the public schools are always the passive 
recipients of students, as students are assigned to them anyway, unlike in the case of private 
schools. It follows that although the institutional design does not enable outright student 
skimming, the public system is still in a different position. In Finland, the private schools also 
lack some of the market incentives as they are not allowed to turn in profit. It should be noted 
that they will still have some incentive to screen students, as their resources are limited and 
some students can take up more of that than others. 
 The hypothesis that competition will improve quality in both schools is a very fragile 
equilibrium here. Essentially this would require Case 1 to be the outcome. If however Case 2 is 
observed, then the quality of the public sector should be decreasing. The profit-motive would 
strengthen the private schools’ incentive to acquire more low-maintenance students, since each 
student brings with them resources in the shape of funding, but will also take up resources. In 
turn this will leave the public sector with more students with lower student achievement. As the 
level of public sector decreases, the private schools do not need to perform substantially better 
as they will still remain a better alternative for the families making the school choice. 
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4. Methodology 
This section will discuss the case study design incorporated in the thesis, the most similar cases 
approach. For the purposes of the research design and the analysis a multilevel model will be 
utilized. The justification for multi-level analysis and its pervasiveness in education research is 
highlighted. 
  
4.1. Most similar cases 
The approach to examining the relation between the structure of the education system and 
student performance requires other factors to also be considered. In a comparative analysis 
between two systems there is a need to consider the framework in which the two cases are 
contrasted. Case selection is essential in this matter, and this thesis employs the most similar 
systems method. In this system the attempt is to consider a question of similarity in the cases: 
“Does one select cases that are apparently the most similar, or should the researcher attempt to 
select cases that are the most different? Further, like much of the other logic of comparative 
analysis, this logic can be applied to both quantitative and qualitative work.” (Peters 1998, 37).  
 In comparative analysis, as Peters notes, the attempt can be seen to be the attempt to 
“maximise experimental variance, minimise error variance, and control extraneous variance” 
(30). Research design can only attempt to minimize, maximize and control variance, but all of 
these variance types will still be present in some form. After all, experimenting on people or 
governments has “a huge number of practical and ethical limitations” (36) so selection of cases 
can have a part in controlling variation. For this reason, it is common for comparative analysis 
thus to display “purposeful, rather than random, selection of the cases” (37). This thesis follows 
this tradition, as the comparison between Finland and Sweden is based on conscious selection 
to ensure a plausible and practical comparison between education systems and providers of 
education. 
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 One of the biggest concerns and limitations of comparative research is how to ensure 
that the variables actually have a relation and the observed correlation is not merely capturing 
something else. As Peters notes, it “may be that it is not possible to identify all the relevant 
factors that can produce differences among systems (38).” However, for the purposes of this 
thesis the difference is there on an institutional level, and the data enables the identification and 
examination of variables relating to this difference. Yet acknowledging the possible limitation 
of the comparative design is crucial and should be considered. Moreover, Przeworski & Teune 
(1970) state that even when observing differences “the efficiency of this strategy in providing 
knowledge that can be generalized is relatively limited (34).” Cautiousness in interpreting the 
results of this thesis for general context is undoubtedly important to note. 
The benefits of utilizing most similar cases are evident in the literature. An important 
benefit is the framework it provides for comparative analysis. As previously discussed, 
comparative analysis has its challenges, but most similar systems can be seen to control for 
variance in the study, as “common systemic characteristics are conceived as ‘controlled for’ 
whereas intersystemic differences are viewed as explanatory variables” (Przeworski & Teune 
1970, 33). The design is also widely used, as Peters (1998) notes how “most similar systems 
design is the usual method that researchers in comparative politics undertake” and how the 
design has been argued “to be the comparative design” (37-38).  
 
 
 
 
27 
 
 
 
4.2. Multilevel model 
Hypotheses on education concern the effects of policies or practices in processes at not only at 
the level of the individual, but also schools or classes. As Raudenbush & Byrk (1986) point out, 
this means than when examining the variables “are typically measured at a higher level of 
aggregation than the outcome variables of interest” (1), and therefore “such hypotheses are 
inherently multilevel (1).”  
An often-used method in measuring student performance is the multilevel model, or 
hierarchical model (e.g. Karakolidis et al. 2016, Martini & Ricci 2010). A multilevel model 
lends itself to school comparison since it considers the grouping of students: the students are 
grouped in a class, or a school so the chance for biased estimates is possible in a standard 
regression which does not take into account the hierarchical grouping. Since hierarchical groups 
are common in social sciences, it is essential to consider these groups in the analysis also, as 
for example Raudenbush & Bryck (2002) mention units such as workplaces and firms appearing 
in analysis (4).  Indeed, education also is used as a frequent basic example on when a multilevel 
regression model is the most suitable method of analysis (Gelman & Hill 2007). 
 The traditional regression analysis has been criticized when used to analyze data from 
schools, as student performance tends to be clustered to groups, such as schools, classes etc. 
and the traditional linear models ignore this, and can “produce misleading results” and that this 
“increasing awareness of the mismatch between multilevel social processes and the traditional 
statistical models used to study them” has resulted in developing multilevel models 
(Raudenbush & Bryck 1986, 1). In measuring student attainment, this is especially useful: it is 
not difficult to see the patterns for levels of schools, classrooms etc. 
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 However, there are issues and limitations to consider in the use of the multi-level model. 
It should be noted that, for example, Karakolidis et al. find that the multilevel model 
underestimation of standard errors and small p values, which can lead to rejection of the null 
hypothesis even when it might be the case (109). With any model, there are restrictions in its 
use and it is crucial to acknowledge possible shortcomings and risks. However, given the long 
tradition of multilevel models in education research and its suitability to the hierarchy of data 
on country and school level, it is an optimal method to be used in the analysis of this data. 
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5. The Data 
This section will briefly introduce the data used, as well as detail the data gathering methods 
and the variables included in the analysis. Justification for the selection of variables is presented 
from previous research in the variable selection, but also some limitations which affected the 
data gathering as well as the availability to use certain variables are discussed. All 
methodological choices were ultimately made by the author. 
 
5.1. Data gathering 
The bulk of the data used in the analysis is from the PISA studies from 2003 to 2015, available 
directly from the OECD online database, unless otherwise indicated. As the school and student 
level data are separate datasets, the author has combined them in preparation for the analysis. 
In total the five cycles used contain a total of 39 182 observations. OECD sorts the data by the 
different three-year cycles, so the various cycles were combined with year added as a separate 
variable by the author. In the data gathering phase the extensive list of different PISA variables 
was narrowed down to the chosen variables, and additional variables for country level was 
chosen. The following section will examine more in detail the method of the inclusion of 
selected control variables as well as the limitations which affected the gathering and formatting 
of the data included. 
The other school level and student level variables are compiled from the OECD PISA 
data available on the OECD PISA website. OECD lists the data in separate datasets by every 
cycle. Although the studies might ask the same questions and thus have common variables, 
every year there is slight variance in for example the order of the questions, the number of digits 
in the variables e.g. in 2003 the school ID is expressed in the format of 0001; in 2015 it includes 
the country number at the beginning of the numeric string, for example as 24600001. To enable 
the analysis of some of these differences, the formats were merged by the author when required. 
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The PISA data lists the variables with a code relating to a question in the school or student 
questionnaire (e.g. first question in the school questionnaire can be labeled as SC01Q01). The 
description of the variable informs the actual question, but as the order of the questions varies 
from cycle to cycle, this in numerous cases required renaming the variables in the raw data. 
The data is listed by the OECD in two separate data sets for each year, a student data set 
and school data set. To compile all the data, first the school and student data sets were merged 
by using the school ID numbers and then the country level variables as well as the PISA year 
were added. This process was repeated for each cycle, and then the relevant variables were 
identified and retitled as necessary in the data. Finally, every year was merged in one dataset 
which includes all the relevant data for the PISA cycles between 2003 and 2015.  
Certain answers needed to be recoded into different values as OECD can list for example 
a missing answer as ‘999’ so in order to avoid bias caused by leaving large numeric numbers 
in the datasets each variable needed to be evaluated for recoding. The fact that not only do the 
cycles vary in terms of the order of the questions, in some cycles certain variables were not 
included at all. These limitations considering data will be discussed later, after introducing the 
variables used for the analysis. 
 
5.2. Variables 
This section will outline the variables included in the analysis, as well as document the data 
from other sources than the PISA database. The control variables have been discussed in 
relation to student performance before, and some of the previous literature will be mentioned. 
Finally, some limitations for the data are discussed, stemming from the data sources, 
documentation and methodological issues. 
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The PISA questionnaire includes the school level data on private and public provision 
of education. There is a question on the institutions themselves as under a private or public 
management, as well as questions on where the school funding comes from (government, 
student fees, and beneficiaries). Funding is reported as percentages in the data, and as 
mentioned in the literature, due to the voucher system public funding is by far the biggest source 
of funding in private schools also. Three school types are also included: public, private 
government-dependent, and private independent. This thesis includes all these variables to offer 
a more comprehensive look at the issue of private and public schools. For the dummy variable 
of private/public, the portion of private schools in the data is 5.20 % for Finland and 10.14 % 
for Sweden, with the total of both countries as 7.05 % of all the schools in the data. 
In addition to the private/public variables presented earlier, these variables include 
among others socio-economic factors, school location, gender, language spoken at home, 
immigration status, and the student performance as the dependent variable. Table 2 lists all the 
variables used in the analysis. 
Table 2. the variables used for the analysis 
Student Level 
Female 
Age 
Immigrant 
Non-Native Speaker 
ESCS Index 
 
School Level 
Small town 
Town 
City  
Large City 
Private 
Government Funded 
Student Fee Funded 
Benefactor Funded 
School Type 
School Size 
Proportion of female students 
Student-Teacher Ratio 
Proportion of qualified teachers 
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Country Level 
Sweden 
PISA Survey year 
GDP** 
Satisfaction with Education* 
 
Note: all the variables are from the OECD except * from 
World Bank and ** from ESS 
 
5.2.1. Country level variables 
The country level control variables are not from the OECD PISA data, but were gathered 
elsewhere. The GDP for each year was collected from the World Bank online data, and the 
variable “satisfaction with education system” from the European Social Survey (ESS) database. 
As the ESS rounds are done every other year, starting from 2002, there was no value for each 
specific year of the PISA cycles (2003, 2009, 2015) so in those cases data from the last available 
year was utilized (2002 for 2003, 2008 for 2009 and 2014 for 2015). Country is presented as a 
dummy variable (SWE=1) in the analysis. 
 
5.2.2. School level variables 
The location of the school has been discussed in relation to student performance in previous 
research. A 2013 OECD report on the 2009 PISA survey notes that there is a difference in 
student performance between urban and rural areas as “on average across  OECD  countries,  
students  who  attend schools in cities of more than 100 000 people perform  better  in  PISA  
than  students  who  attend  schools  in  villages,  rural  areas,  or  towns  with  up  to  100  000  
inhabitants (OECD 2013, 1).” This difference is not independent of other factors, as the report 
notes that “while the performance difference is related to the socio-economic status of students, 
it is also associated with some of the characteristics that distinguish urban schools, such as 
having more and better resources, greater autonomy in how they allocate those resources, and 
33 
 
 
 
an adequate supply of teachers (4).” This analysis also includes the location of a school as a 
control variable, scaled from rural to urban. 
  School size is also included as a school level variable. Since classroom size was not 
included in all the PISA data (the chapter on limitations will cover this more in depth) the 
students per teacher ratio is included. Proportion of certified teachers is included to control for 
the qualifications of the teaching staff at the schools. 
 
5.2.3. Student level variables 
On the student level the variables included are sex, age, immigration status, whether the 
language spoken at home is the same as the test language, and ESCS. The ESCS is the PISA 
index of economic, social and cultural status, and it consists of: 
“the International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI); the highest 
level of education of the student’s parents, converted into years of schooling; the PISA 
index of family wealth; the PISA index of home educational resources; and the PISA 
index of possessions related to “classical” culture in the family home.” (OECD 
Education at a Glance Glossary 2002, 10) 
 
Immigration and education have been shown to connect in many ways. For example in 
the USA immigrant students have been shown to have less schooling on average (Smith 2006), 
and that there is “considerable diversity in the schooling accomplishments among different 
immigrant sub-groups (186).” The PISA data enables controlling for immigration and student’s 
language at home, which is expected to have an effect on the performance. A 2015 OECD report 
suggests that “PISA data have consistently shown a performance gap between students with an 
immigrant background and non-immigrant students (1).” In the case of Finland and Sweden the 
report shows that in Finland the performance gap in mathematics is actually wider than in 
Sweden between immigrant and non-immigrant students, and that the gap has widened between 
2003 and 2012, while in Sweden it has decreased (3).  
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Although the significance of gender on student performance has been contested (for 
example Lindberg et al. 2010 find no gender difference in mathematics performance based on 
data from 242 studies and four large US national data sets), in some contexts however it has 
been found to be a statistically significant factor (Karakolidis et al. 2016). Thus gender is taken 
as a control variable in the analysis. 
The actual student performance in the three tested subjects (math, science, and reading) 
are reported in the PISA data as plausible values. As the OECD PISA data analysis manual 
(2009) mentions, “it is unreasonable and perhaps undesirable to assess each sampled student 
with the whole item battery” since “after extended testing time, students’ results start to be 
affected by fatigue” and “school principals would  refuse  to  free  their  students  for  the  very  
long  testing  period” (80), so the student scores are reported as plausible values, scaled using 
the Rasch model (OECD 2009, 118). The Rasch model is a type of logit model which “describes 
the probability that, when a group of individuals are asked a number of questions, individual j 
makes a mistake in answering question k (Upton & Cook 2016).” The Rasch model has been 
used in the literature in test performances (e.g. Beglar 2010) so it is not uncommon in literature 
on information about test scores. 
Taking into consideration the recommendation of the OECD PISA data analysis manual 
(2009), the plausible values presenting the student performance have been calculated from five 
separate plausible values for each subject found in the data to avoid bias in the results. Then 
using this total value of each subject a separate multilevel model is calculated. In addition to 
this, the student weights from the PISA data were used in the multilevel regression model to 
avoid possible bias stemming from sample sizes. 
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5.3. Limitations 
There were some limiting factors and issues when compiling the data from different PISA 
cycles. The data for the 2000 survey was excluded since the student performance was divided 
by each measured subject (i.e. math, science, reading) into separate data sets while other cycles 
list all three for each student. The number of cases varies between the three datasets, so in order 
to avoid a large amount of missing data the 2000 cycle was omitted by the author.  
 While previous literature on the analysis of student performance has included variables 
such as pre-primary education attendance and found them statistically significant to student 
performance (e.g. Karakolidis, Pitsia & Emvalotis, 2016), this analysis has not incorporated 
every possible variation from the PISA studies due to the difference of the data gathering in the 
survey cycles. For example, reporting class size was missing from the 2003 and 2009 cycles. 
In cases like this the variable can be suggested to be worth considering in the analysis, but to 
avoid missing data they too were omitted. However for example student to teacher ratio can be 
seen to help cover some of this missing data. Some missing information was completed by the 
author, i.e. 2015 school level data on “proportion of girls” was calculated from the reported 
total number of students and number of female students. 
 Still, the variables did include some missing data: for example in the 2015 Swedish data 
all of the schools did not report whether they are public or private, nor did the percentages of 
their sources of funding. However, these cases of missing data were exceptions rather than a 
recurring issue and the analysis itself was successfully completed despite this. In the results 
section some of the missing data was accounted for by checking for robustness. In addition to 
the limitations in the data gathering process, to circumvent possible issues of co-linearity 
additional analysis was carried out to ensure robustness in the school type and private/ public 
dummy variable.  
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 The variables about education are much more complex than single variables can often 
capture, and certain level of simplification is a requirement for any data analysis. Issues such 
as teacher quality are much more complex than simply whether the teacher is qualified or not. 
Some aspects which can be argued to affect student performance such as homework, classroom 
environment, teaching material etc. are not included partly because of their availability in the 
PISA data and partly because of the focus of the analysis. The so-called kitchen sink -approach 
is not beneficial to a complex matter such as education system, as arguments can be made about 
many choices in the variables selection. All additional data however can be utilized when 
considering possible future research into the topic.  
 In conclusion, future research can aim to incorporate a higher number of relevant 
variables in the model, but for the purposes of this thesis the chosen variables provide sufficient 
number of variables on country level, school level as well as student level. Although some of 
the variable selection had to be made due to technical constraints, the PISA data provides a 
comparable and comprehensive set of information for all the selected variables for all the cycles 
from 2003 to 2015. Some issues about missing data and robustness will be accounted for in 
additional analysis. 
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6. Results 
The results obtained from the PISA data are presented below. Three separate multi-level 
analysis was conducted, one for each test subject. The main focus of the discussion will be on 
interpreting the results for the private and public provision of education, but as the theoretical 
background shows, and given the complex nature of factors involved in student performance, 
other variables will also be considered. The results are presented below in addition to further 
discussion on them.  
 
Table 2: Multilevel Estimates of Student Performance 
 Science Math Reading 
Student Level       
Female 5.45***    -3.31*** 46.78*** 
 (1.039) (0.974) (0.949) 
Age 10.19***    12.29*** 10.56*** 
 (1.674) (1.587) (1.734) 
Immigrant -43.63*** -31.07*** -32.79*** 
 (3.051) (2.854) (2.721) 
Non-Native Speaker -8.06*** -7.63*** -7.78*** 
 (0.593) (0.542) (0.627) 
ESCS Index 31.22*** 30.77*** 29.71*** 
 (0.835) (0.757) (0.849) 
School Level      
Small town 1.18 -2.16 2.10 
 (3.763) (3.620) (3.876) 
Town -1.03** -0.55 5.82 
 (3.956) (3.641) (3.988) 
City  -2.40** -3.46 4.77 
 (4.917) (4.660) (4.732) 
Large City 27.15*** 23.12** 27.01** 
 (8.047) (10.780) (10.504) 
Private 13.48** 12.01** 19.40*** 
 (6.284) (5.585) (6.200) 
Government Funded 1.98 -0.19 0.94 
 (1.740) (1.426) (2.380) 
Student Fee Funded 2.57 -0.40 -0.48 
 (2.577) (2.073) (2.940) 
Benefactor Funded -2.41 -4.33** -2.63 
 (2.065) (1.918) (2.913) 
School Type 1.12 -2.06 0.18 
 (5.166) (4.771) (5.013) 
School Size 0.02*** -0.03*** 0.03*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Proportion of Female Students         0.03 0.19 -0.02 
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     (0.205) (0.186) (0.194) 
Student-Teacher Ratio 0.22 0.04 0.40* 
 (0.495) (0.503) (0.559) 
Proportion of Certified Teachers       13.08 11.24 16.87 
 (8.960) (8.636) (10.295) 
Country Level       
Sweden -46.96** -27.49 -30.91* 
 (18.556) (18.873) (18.767) 
PISA Survey year -4.01*** -5.83*** -4.19*** 
 (0.866) (0.872) (0.975) 
GDP 12.74*** 12.56*** 6.52 
 (4.122) (4.034) (4.423) 
Satisfaction with Education 4.14 7.94 3.67 
 (8.529) (8.724) (8.556) 
Constant 8125.349*** 11931.78*** 8575.05*** 
 (1705.111) (1725.805) (1928.933) 
Observations 39182  -“-  -“- 
Number of Schools 405 -“- -“- 
Number of Countries 611 -”- -“- 
Log Likelihood -3264755.8 -3221558.1 -3236331.6 
Wald Chi-Square 4190.90***  4894.04*** 6159.06*** 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses * indicates p<0.1; ** 
p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
 
 
 
6.1. Private and public actors 
Overall, the dummy variable for private/public shows that private schools do have a statistically 
significant positive impact on student performance in all the three subjects. The significance in 
especially reading is strong, and in science the coefficient is the also the largest. The school 
type variable is not statistically significant in any case, and has mixed results as in mathematics 
the coefficient is negative. Also, it has a smaller positive coefficient than the private/public 
dummy variable.  
Funding aspect gives mixed, insignificant results in all the cases. It should be noted that 
government funding covers most of the private schools also, so it does not separate between the 
private and public school performance. Although the results are not statistically significant, 
student fees have a negative coefficient in all but science results, while benefactor funding has 
a negative coefficient across the board. However, the share of non-governmental funding is a 
small part of all the observations: out of the total number of observations, only 8.97% of the 
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cases report less than 99,99% of their funding from government. This shows that even in the 
for-profit private schools the largest part of resources for the school come from the government, 
which is in accordance to the background literature. 
 
6.1.2. Private and public actors: implications for the model 
Making a definitive statement about the results would not be justified, but some cautious 
theoretical assumptions on the mechanisms can be made. There are at least two alternatives 
which can be discussed: either the private schools have managed to attract resources and 
students, leaving the public sector with lower-performing students, which contributes to the gap 
between private and public school student performance. As the student level variables are 
statistically significant in every case, with all the p-values <0.01, this seems to suggest that 
student features have more pronounced of an impact than the school. From this follows the 
assumption that a school would have incentives to select students in some manner; students 
who bring in more resources than they use. 
It should be noted in this case also that in Finland the share of private schools in the data 
(5.2 %) is smaller than in Sweden (10.14 %), so the claim can be made that perhaps the largest 
part of the effect comes from Sweden. Although the coefficient is a positive one, Sweden has 
lower overall student attainment scores than Finland for all the subjects in all the PISA cycles. 
The fact that in Sweden most of the schools are still public yet the private schools are correlated 
with better student attainment makes it questionable to assume that the schools do not only gain 
better results through increased performance level, but the students leaving public schools 
might decrease attainment at those schools. 
 One matter to keep in mind when discussing the results is that the distribution of the 
results is not apparent in the regression. In future studies the distribution could be argued to be 
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a worthwhile topic of consideration: indeed, in discussing student performance it is crucial to 
bear in mind that the spread of the results across the board can help in discussing the system as 
a whole. A system with wide performance gap amongst the schools can still yield a high mean 
score. Furthermore, as discussed earlier the gap might not be only due to improvement in one 
set of results but also a decline in the other.  
 A certain issue of causation occurs when theorizing for the efficiency of private schools: 
are they in themselves better than public schools due to innovation, freedom and de-
centralization, or have they managed to gather the resources and students to obtain a high level 
of not only q but also the prestige γ, and thus becoming a choice with better utility for the 
families choosing the schools? The incentives as presented in the model could suggest the latter, 
but any definitive statement would need more data and background research, such as 
comparable data on the level of student performance in Sweden and Finland before the reforms 
of the 1990s to compare if there was a difference in the results before that. 
 One theoretical assumption from the literature on private schools which the results do 
not seem to support is that the quality and performance of public schools would increase as well 
with competition: although the private schools correlate with higher student performance, the 
Swedish results are also significantly lower than in Finland, where the reform did not lead to 
market competition in regards to schools. It can be the case Swedish students are lower 
performers for other reasons, but the effect of private schools and competition still seems to be 
minimal in raising quality across the board in private and public sector.  
 This would have indication in the policy suggestions about the effectiveness and 
efficiency or market incentives. It seems that at least on the level of student performance private 
schools do perform better than the public ones. How this develops the public sector is not 
evident from the data, but the model would suggest that not only do the private schools perform 
better, but the public schools’ quality can deteriorate as a result of this. Although the results in 
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within a single system can seem like a preferred one, the comparison offers some perspective 
on the impact of the system. 
According to the model, there is an incentive for the private schools to outperform the 
public schools: but as they improve, the resources move with the students, and the schools might 
for example become a more appealing workplace for teachers etc. This can lead to the self-
sustaining equilibrium of resources escaping the public sector mentioned in the model. The 
strong increasing impact of the proportion of certified teachers (although it is not statistically 
significant) suggests that the teachers matter also, but whether this is once again a result of e.g. 
private schools having more effective methods of teaching, or stemming from attracting more 
resources (such as better teachers) is worth pointing out. 
Since the PISA data does not differentiate between strictly for-profit schools from for 
example schools set up by religious organizations or for example schools set up for other 
reasons (e.g. Rudolph Steiner schools) it is not possible to make a too strong of a statement 
regarding the role of private schools. Although the profit motive might have an impact, it is 
likely that not all private schools in Sweden exist for the profit motive in the same manner. 
Moreover, the families choosing a school run by a religious organization, or one with a different 
pedagogical theory than other schools, might not care only about the actual q of the school, but 
prefer and emphasize different rationale in the selection process. Nevertheless, as in Finland 
that market-based incentive is not even an option for the schools it can be suggested to be more 
prevalent and have an impact in the Swedish student attainment results. 
Worth noting is that the model or the results do not suggest so-called “cream skimming” 
where the private schools only accept or find strategies to acquire the top level students. The 
logic of wanting to get more resources than spending them however does not rely on this 
assumption or suggest that it is the only outcome of such an incentive.  
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In conclusion, from the data can be argued that private and public provision can be seen 
to have an effect. For the individual student attending private school seems to have a positive 
impact in student attainment, yet for the system in general it does not seem to yield overall 
improvement in the student performance. This is in accordance to some of the earlier theories 
and seems to offer more support towards the hypothesis of inequality in terms of the quality of 
schools than the overall improvement through competition. 
 
6.2. Results and restrictions: Collinearity 
An issue of possible collinearity in the results the school type (public- private, public 
management- private, private management) and the dummy variable for private school can be 
raised, as both concern the management of the school.  To control for this, additional multilevel 
analysis was run with each variable left out. The exclusion of public/private dummy variable 
does increase the coefficient for school type, but there is no change in the significance of p-
values for either of the variables. The table below illustrates the changes in all the subjects with 
both cases alongside a comparison with the original model. Nevertheless, in future analysis a 
more precise categorizing of the school management variables can be in order. As previously 
discussed, private schools can have different incentives for their operation, and lumping all of 
them under one banner might not be the most optimal manner to categorize and discuss them. 
 
 Table 3: Multilevel analysis for collinearity – 
School type and Private/ Public 
  
 
School 
type (og) 
School 
type only 
Private 
(og) 
Private 
only 
  
Subject          
Science 1.12 4.65 13.48** 13.88**   
 (5.166) (4.561) (6.284) (5.503)   
Math -2.06 1.09 12.01** 11.28**   
 (4.771) (4.317) (5.585) (4.893)   
Reading 0.18 5.24 19.40*** 19.46***   
 (5.013) (4.639) (6.200) (5.540)   
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 Notes: og = original analysis, see Table 2. Standard errors are reported 
in parentheses * indicates p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
 
  
The fact that there seems to be little collinearity with school type and private/public 
dummy variable is hardly surprising. In both Finland and Sweden the funding comes mostly 
from the government, so there is not too much overlap between school type and private and 
public schools expected: after all, the private schools form both private – government dependent 
and private – government independent categories. As can be seen, leaving out the dummy 
variable for private and public does increase the coefficients for school type in all the subjects, 
but it still is not statistically significant. Leaving out school type however does not alter the 
significance of private/public as a variable, and the change in the coefficients is also small. 
The PISA data records both the management and funding of schools. Although the 
analysis has incorporated all the possible variables concerning this it is possible to assume that 
also school type and school funding might have collinearity issues, as government-independent 
schools can be expected to use student fees more than government funding. To check for 
collinearity in this case a similar analysis as in the previous one was conducted, with dropping 
student fees and school type. The results are shown below in Table 4. 
 Table 4: Multilevel analysis for collinearity – 
School type and Student fees 
  
 
School 
type (og) 
School 
type only 
Student 
fees (og) 
Student 
fees only 
  
Subject          
Science 1.12 0.73 2.57 2.58   
 (5.166) (5.197) (2.577) (2.552)   
Math -2.06 -2.53 -0.40 -0.42   
 (4.771) (4.744) (2.073) (2.090)   
Reading 0.18 0.07 -0.48 -0.48   
 (5.013) (5.007) (2.940) (2.935)   
 Notes: og = original analysis, see Table 2. Standard errors are reported 
in parentheses * indicates p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
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In the case of Student fee funding and School type, the significances do not change 
dramatically in any case. Removing a variable does very little to the coefficients and rbust 
standard errors also. Especially in the case of student fees this is the case, but it does not seem 
surprising since student fees are a very rare source of funding in both countries. 
 
6.3 Results and restrictions: Missing data 
As mentioned in the data section, 2015 has many cases of schools not willing to report if they 
are a public or private school, their school type or the funding percentages for the data. Although 
encountering missing data is by no means a rare phenomenon in the analysis in the social 
sciences, and although it is a rare occurrence in this data also, it is nevertheless a notable issue 
which can be addressed. To account for the missing data and whether it influences the analysis, 
an additional multilevel analysis was conducted using only the 2003-2012 PISA cycles. The 
results are presented below in Table 5. The changes in significance of the variables has been 
highlighted, and the implications are discussed below. 
Table 5: Multilevel Estimates of Student Performance 
(2003-2012 only) 
 Science Math Reading 
Student Level       
Female 4.78***    -3.71*** 46.93*** 
 (1.083) (1.022) (0.997) 
Age 9.87***    12.46*** 10.22*** 
 (1.754) (1.672) (1.822) 
Immigrant -42.98*** -30.54*** -31.75*** 
 (3.136) (2.934) (2.787) 
Non-Native Speaker -8.06*** -7.62*** -7.78*** 
 (0.595) (0.544) (0.630) 
ESCS Index 31.16*** 30.78*** 29.68*** 
 (0.872) (0.791) (0.890) 
School Level      
Small town 1.30 -2.07 2.23 
 (3.786) (3.640) (3.894) 
Town -0.95 -0.49 5.90 
 (3.975) (3.654) (4.001) 
City  -2.38 -3.42 4.81 
 (4.940) (4.670) (4.751) 
Large City 27.16*** 23.10** 26.90** 
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 (8.042) (10.720) (10.475) 
Private 13.44** 11.90** 19.28*** 
 (6.297) (5.591) (6.214) 
Government Funded 2.03 -0.14 1.01 
 (1.774) (1.448) (2.411) 
Student Fee Funded 2.63 -0.35 -0.41 
 (2.593) (2.087) (2.963) 
Benefactor Funded -2.37 -4.30** -2.57 
 (2.092) (1.928) (2.934) 
School Type 1.03 -2.13 0.12 
 (5.179) (4.779) (5.024) 
School Size 0.02*** -0.03*** 0.03*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Proportion of Female Students         0.02 0.20 -0.01 
     (0.207) (0.187) (0.195) 
Student-Teacher Ratio 0.24 0.05 0.42 
 (0.496) (0.504) (0.561) 
Proportion of Certified Teachers       13.07 11.10 16.77 
 (9.050) (8.713) (10.372) 
Country Level       
Sweden -42.39** -19.59 -22.41 
 (19.595) (20.031) (19.802) 
PISA Survey year -4.19*** -6.17*** -4.50*** 
 (0.969) (0.985) (1.074) 
GDP 13.49*** 13.91*** 7.76 
 (4.490) (4.442) (4.781) 
Satisfaction with Education 5.12 9.74 5.31 
 (8.842) (9.078) (8.846) 
Constant 8489.995*** 12579.67*** 9180.599*** 
 (1901.634) (1940.806) (2115.775) 
Observations 35607  -“-  -“- 
Number of Schools 303 -“- -“- 
Number of Countries 509 -”- -“- 
Log Likelihood -3063471.9 -3026667.8 -3038471.9 
Wald Chi-Square 4100.90***  4821.60*** 5750.23*** 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses * indicates p<0.1; ** 
p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
 
 
 
 In the cases highlighted the coefficients’ p-values changed enough to no longer be 
statistically significant (p<0.1). For science excluding the 2015 data increases the p-values for 
city and town, and for reading student-teacher ratio and dummy variable for Sweden are no 
longer statistically significant. For the case of mathematics, the significances do not change at 
all. For the focus of this thesis, the values relating to the significance of public/private dummy 
variable, school type or funding do not change in a statistically significant way for any of the 
subjects. This would seem to suggest that despite the missing data, the original analysis gives a 
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sufficient result concerning the variables chosen. Some variation in the coefficients and robust 
standard errors occurs, but this is to be expected as an entire cycle’s worth of results is omitted.  
 Overall the private and public provision of education has a statistically significant part 
in student performance in several ways. The implications of the results can be discussed in the 
framework of the model presented, and although definitive statements are challenging to make 
based on the single analysis, at the very least the overall improvement of quality through 
competition does not seem to realize in the student performance. The following part will 
highlight other  
 
6.4. Additional results: Country level variables 
Table 6: Multilevel Estimates of Student Performance – 
Country Level 
 Science Math Reading 
Country Level       
Sweden -46.96** -27.49 -30.91* 
 (18.556) (18.873) (18.767) 
PISA Survey year -4.01*** -5.83*** -4.19*** 
 (0.866) (0.872) (0.975) 
GDP 12.74*** 12.56*** 6.52 
 (4.122) (4.034) (4.423) 
Satisfaction with Education 4.14 7.94 3.67 
 (8.529) (8.724) (8.556) 
 
 The country level variables show statistical significance in the cases of GDP, PISA 
survey year and dummy variable for Sweden. Out of these only PISA survey year shows strong 
significance in all the cases, while Sweden in cases for science and reading, and GDP for 
science and math. Out of these, GDP has a strong statistical significance in science and math, 
but causation and correlation between these should not be assumed. Both Sweden and Finland 
are countries with relatively constant GDP through the cycles, so the direct effect is debatable. 
The PISA year shows a negative coefficient, but given Finland’s decline in scores since 2006 
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and Swedish results only having improved in the latest set of results from 2015, it is hardly 
surprising and seems to merely show this correlation. The unit of country in the study is a huge 
group, so the explanatory power of even the statistically significant variables is unlikely.  
 
6.5. Additional Results: School level variables 
Table 7: Multilevel Estimates of Student Performance – 
School Level 
 Science Math Reading 
School Level      
Small town 1.18 -2.16 2.10 
 (3.763) (3.620) (3.876) 
Town -1.03** -0.55 5.82 
 (3.956) (3.641) (3.988) 
City  -2.40** -3.46 4.77 
 (4.917) (4.660) (4.732) 
Large City 27.15*** 23.12** 27.01** 
 (8.047) (10.780) (10.504) 
Private 13.48** 12.01** 19.40*** 
 (6.284) (5.585) (6.200) 
Government Funded 1.98 -0.19 0.94 
 (1.740) (1.426) (2.380) 
Student Fee Funded 2.57 -0.40 -0.48 
 (2.577) (2.073) (2.940) 
Benefactor Funded -2.41 -4.33** -2.63 
 (2.065) (1.918) (2.913) 
School Type 1.12 -2.06 0.18 
 (5.166) (4.771) (5.013) 
School Size 0.02*** -0.03*** 0.03*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Proportion of Female Students         0.03 0.19 -0.02 
     (0.205) (0.186) (0.194) 
Student-Teacher Ratio 0.22 0.04 0.40* 
 (0.495) (0.503) (0.559) 
Proportion of Certified Teachers       13.08 11.24 16.87 
 (8.960) (8.636) (10.295) 
 
Out of the school level variables, other than the private dummy variables, school size and 
location have statistical significance. This thesis does not focus on these issues per se, and it 
should be noted that especially in the cases of school location the variable for “A large city” 
includes only Stockholm and Helsinki, so it should be kept in mind when considering the 
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results. Whether the causation tells about the schools of the area or the student material is again 
debatable. Metropolitan areas can be seen to have access to plenty of resources so the schools 
themselves can have better access for resources such as funding, qualified teachers etc. but 
cities can also attract for example families with better socio-economic background.  
One implication of the positive effect of the schools in a large city is that a difference 
between urban and rural areas can be seen. The coefficients for town and city which are negative 
in both science and math, but it should be noted that only in the case of science they are 
statistically significant.  
School size is another consistently significant school level factor, but the coefficient is 
very small in all the subjects, and has somewhat mixed results ranging from -0.03 to 0.02. This 
could suggest that school, although significant, has a minimal effect on an institutional level in 
either systems. 
In future analysis focusing the scope of the research by comparing for example only 
schools in large city areas can add to the details about student performance across systems, and 
make a most similar cases design stronger. The interaction between variables is very possible, 
so accounting for differences in them can lead to more precise results in the future. 
 
6.6. Additional Results: Student level variables 
Table 8: Multilevel Estimates of Student Performance – 
Student Level 
 Science Math Reading 
Student Level       
Female 5.45***    -3.31*** 46.78*** 
 (1.039) (0.974) (0.949) 
Age 10.19***    12.29*** 10.56*** 
 (1.674) (1.587) (1.734) 
Immigrant -43.63*** -31.07*** -32.79*** 
 (3.051) (2.854) (2.721) 
Non-Native Speaker -8.06*** -7.63*** -7.78*** 
 (0.593) (0.542) (0.627) 
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ESCS Index 31.22*** 30.77*** 29.71*** 
 (0.835) (0.757) (0.849) 
 
Most of the significant coefficients are at the student level variables. Each of the five variables 
is statistically significant, with especially immigration and socio-economic features affecting 
the PISA score. This can be seen to suggest that the student material has a larger effect on the 
student performance than the school as an institution. However, as it seems to matter who 
provides the education and there is variation between institutional elements it is not only a 
matter of the features of a population. To ensure a more comprehensive hypothesis a 
comparable data from a period before the 1990s reforms from both countries should be 
examined to make a comparative argument. 
 The PISA studies test the skills of 15-year-olds, so the fact that age has a positive 
coefficient does not seem to contradict conventional wisdom about schooling: after all the older 
students might have one year more of schooling depending on when they began school: for 
example a 15-year-old born very late in the year might still attend the eighth grade. 
 The differences between the three subjects show notable results. As the previous 
literature has been mixed about female versus male students in terms of student attainment, in 
this analysis it seemed to have a significant, although somewhat mixed effect. The effect varies 
across subjects: female students tend to perform slightly better in science, and slightly worse in 
math. For math previous studies have shown that depending on the context sex may matter ion 
the results, but it should be noted that in terms of math results the coefficient is smaller than the 
other negative coefficients. But in terms of reading the female students outperform the male 
students by a very large coefficient, 46.78, which is in fact the largest coefficient of all the data. 
This raises questions on the possible causes for this, but seems to be a common phenomenon in 
students.  
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 This trend could make having female students more desirable for schools as they seem 
likely to yield higher test scores in standardized tests. It can suggest that male students are either 
not as well adjusted to the demands of school in all the topics, or that they will require more 
resources to improve the results. As they outperform female students in math, this coefficient 
is substantially is smaller than the performance gap in reading, and indeed in science also. The 
proportion of female students does not have a significant role at the school level, so the effect 
is largely on student level. 
 Immigration has the most substantial negative coefficients in all the data, with especially 
science. The fact that immigration has a strong negative coefficient on student attainment seems 
logical: as the PISA studies measures 15-year-olds it is not clear what kinds of backgrounds the 
students have, or how long they have been attending the current system they are in. Non-
immigrants have been accustomed to the education system possibly from pre-school already, 
while the data does not differentiate the background for the immigrant students. The statistically 
significant factor of not being a native speaker of the school language shows also that there is 
a language barrier which plays a part in the student attainment.  
 Socio-economic background as measured in the ESCS index shows a statistically 
significant positive coefficient: in fact, out of all the positive coefficients it is the highest in all 
three disciplines. This is in line with the previous literature, as socio-economic factors have a 
substantial role in student attainment. Out of all the single factors, it should be noted that the 
student level variables interact with each other, and none of them by itself helps to explain all 
the entire phenomenon. OECD notes that for example in the performance gap in mathematics 
between immigrant and non-immigrant students in the 2003 and 2012 PISA data shrinks by 
almost half when accounting for socio-economic differences (OECD 2015, 4). 
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7. Conclusions and further research 
 The multilevel-analysis offered insight to student performance and the role of private 
and public providers of education in the Finnish and Swedish cases. A model considering the 
role of market incentives point to the possibility of either improvement through competition or 
inequality through deterioration of quality in the private sector. The notion that private school 
would want to select the most low-maintenance students cannot be seen in the analysis 
decisively, the evidence suggests that there is a difference in public and private actors. The 
multilevel model shows that the most significant coefficient results occurred in the student 
variables, but whether the school is a private or public one contributes to student performance 
as well.  
In the results of the multilevel regression model private schools indicate higher scores 
in the PISA results with strong statistical significance. However, as Sweden has a larger share 
of private schools yet lower overall scores, it is possible that this indicates an increasing gap 
between the student performance instead of improving the results. In terms of the model 
presented this is plausible, as concentrating on student selection in any manner will leave the 
public sector as a passive recipient of students who do not perhaps have interest or resources to 
select schools. 
 Several issues need to be considered in the discussion about the results. Some matters 
of collinearity can be detected in the setup for the data, but checking for effects in the analysis 
turned out to have a very minimal effect on trends of any of the main results. In addition to this, 
the case of missing data for 2015 was found to have very little effect on the main findings, 
indicating that it did not create large problems with the analysis of the data, but the analysis is 
valid even with the cases of missing data. 
 
52 
 
 
 
 Student level factors have a statistically significant result, and as previous literature 
suggests, the effects of socio-economic factors, immigration status and gender play a part in 
student performance. The student level variables are more statistically significant than the 
school level variables, so student features can be seen to affect the student attainment more than 
the institutional features, so the schools can have an incentive to choose students. 
 In terms of analysis the same data could be analyzed with different models, and adding 
relevant variables could improve the precision of the model. Previous literature has shown that 
there are other relevant factors to student attainment, and any strong claim for the importance 
of any of the individual factors must be approached with caution as the actual schooling does 
not happen in a vacuum but the result has many contributing factors which interact and 
influence each other in a myriad of ways.  
 The way nesting in a multilevel-data is perceived can affect not only the method but the 
results. The nesting can be seen to occur within students in a class, classes in a school, schools 
within an area etc. This analysis omits the variable of a classroom as the data does not support 
this type of grouping of observations, so another valid approach in the future can be attempting 
to examine also the class-room level of variables. 
As the variables on all level are limited, a logical next step is in considering the 
availability and inclusion of additional variables and data. For further research going into more 
detail about the student material in both private and public schools would be beneficial. The 
results from an analysis including more information can also prove a fruitful source for models 
and suggestions about the function of private schools as an institution. Moreover, an extended 
analysis on several systems could be overtaken. This thesis uses only two systems as a case 
study, but for example the introduction of student fees in a system can prove a worthwhile 
element in discussing the incentives of the schools. The line between broadening the scope by 
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examining different international systems versus focusing more at the student level variables 
depends on the purposes and implications of studies on student attainment.  
 The fact that the PISA data does not allow to differentiate between private for-profit 
schools and other private schools is worth noting in future research. Speculation on whether 
this has any effect in the incentives can be made, but for this essay it will remain purely 
hypothetical as a clear distinction is not in the data. For example, a case could be made that 
schools operated by religious or charity organizations can have different incentives in the 
students they aim to attract, but as mentioned this cannot be seen in the current data. The 
rationale behind the incentive model would suggest that it can have an impact on both the 
incentives of a school and the families selecting a school. 
 An important aspect of the results is the interaction of different variables. Accounting 
for differences in for example socio-economic background, school location, immigration status 
etc. can be beneficial in future research if more comparable claims are to be made about a 
certain aspect between systems, or indeed even within a single one. Previous literature shows 
for example how socio-economic factors and immigration, although related, still show a 
statistically significant effect when taken into account.  
 Finally, it is crucial to note that as criticism towards student attainment as a measure of 
an education system points out the role of student performance in education systems can be 
overemphasized, and an argument can be made that it is not the only meaningful outcome of 
education for either individuals or society. The PISA cycle of 2015 for example is the first to 
map out students’ wellbeing, and in future studies on the role of market incentives in education 
relating to concepts like wellbeing, inequality, and the performance gap between genders are 
possible to operationalize and consider in quantitative measures as dependent variables to 
examine the effect of policies and practices in each system. Both broadening the scope of the 
model and adding to its precision can be done through measures such as these, which aid in 
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creating a possible representation of the institutional effect that market incentives have in public 
policies. As interest in education systems in different disciplines continues it is no doubt a 
fruitful and important topic of research in the future. 
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